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The Police Can Do What? Making Local
Governmental Entities Pay for
Unauthorized Wiretapping
The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is
far greater than that involved in tampering with the mails.
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons
at both ends of the line is invaded, and all conversations be-
tween them upon any subject, and although proper, confiden-
tial and privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping
of one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the tele-
phone of every other person whom he may call, or who may call
him. As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general
warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression
when compared with wire-tapping. I
-Justice Louis Brandeis
I. INTRODUCTION
New technologies are constantly being developed to enhance
our ability to communicate. Along with legitimate uses by citizens,
criminals constantly obtain the newest communication tools to
evade detection and elude capture by law enforcement officials on
all levels. Frustrated by the investigative limitations of antiquated
laws, agents and officers turned to Congress to aid them in their
war against crime.2 Congress has responded by updating federal
laws in an attempt to keep pace with technological advances.
3
With the advent of the telegraph as a means of communica-
tions, the 1800's opened the door to a new era of connectivity be-
tween individuals. 4 The telegraph allowed messages to be sent
cross-country far quicker than any messenger could deliver them.
5
But with this new power of communication came corruption. 6 Peo-
I Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475-76 (1928).
2 See infra note 40.
3 See infra Part I.C.
4 See infra note 60.
5 See infra note 60.
6 See infra Part H.A.
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pie used the telegraph to run high-powered gambling operations,
steal secrets from competitors, and defraud stock investors. 7
The next step forward was the invention and use of the tele-
phone.8 Whereas the telegraph allowed individuals to send text-
messages, the telephone allowed contemporaneous conversation
between individuals thousands of miles away.9 Yet, similar to the
telegraph, abuse of the system became possible.10 With the aid of
phone companies, police and politicians were able to intercept com-
munications between individuals without consent from telephone
users.11 Newspapers even used wiretapping to scoop stories from
competitors.
12
The first legislation by Congress regarding wiretapping was the
passage of the Anti-Wiretap Act. 13 The legislation was extended
with the Federal Communications Act of 1934,14 which prohibited
the divulgement of any information in an interstate communication
sent by wire. 15 The federal judiciary confronted the prevalence of
wiretapping with a series of opinions attempting to balance an indi-
vidual's right of privacy with the authority of the government.' 6
Originally, the balance of power swung in favor of governmental
authority, 17 but 40 years later, the Supreme Court had come full
circle to recognize the importance of an individual's right to
privacy.'
In 1968, Congress responded to the Supreme Court decision in
Katz v. United States 9 and enacted the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 196820 in order to deal with emerging tech-
nologies used in various criminal ventures.21 Alongside various
7 See infra Part II.A.
8 See infra Part II.A.
9 See infra Part II.A.
10 See infra Part II.A.
11 See infra Part II.A.
12 See infra Part II.A.; see also note 68 and accompanying text.
13 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
14 Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934), 48 Stat.
1064, 1103 [hereinafter FCA] (amended by Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (1968)).
15 Id.
16 See infra Part II.A.
17 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see infra Part II.A.1.
18 Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347 (1967); see infra Part II.A.7.
19 Katz, 398 U.S. at 347; see infra Part II.A.7.
20 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§803, 82 Stat. 223 (1968) [hereinafter OCSA].
21 See Hogan testimony, infra note 41.
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criminal procedures, Congress included 18 U.S.C. section 2520(a),
creating a section for civil liability against a person violating the
statute.22 The civil remedies section created a private cause of ac-
tion for those whose rights were violated through the use of
wiretapping.
23
In 1986, the federal wiretapping law was amended in response
to the growing use of electronic communications. 24 Congress had
not contemplated widespread use of computers and wireless phones
in 1968, causing the OCSA to be ill equipped to deal with emerging
technologies. 25 The amendments, generally referred to as the Elec-
tronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, amended the civil rem-
edy statute to add "or entity" 26 after the word "person".2 7
Finally, in response to the attack on the United States on Sep-
tember 11, 2001, Congress passed the "Uniting and Strengthening
America Act by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001."28 The Act focused on
combating terrorism by strengthening immigration policies, com-
bating international money laundering, and increasing surveillance
domestically and abroad.29 Specifically, it amended the federal
wiretapping statute's civil remedies provision to add "other than
the United States" 30 after the words "person or entity".31
This Note will explore the different interpretations of the
amendments to the federal wiretapping act and the effect on the
liability of a government entity. It will focus on the role of a govern-
mental entity, such as a municipality, which operates on either a
state or local, as opposed to on a federal, level. Whereas some
courts have held that these local entities are not subject to civil lia-
bility,32 that view creates an illogical exception to the wiretapping
22 See OCSA §803.
23 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (2002).
24 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§ 103, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) [hereinafter ECPA].
25 See infra note 267
26 ECPA § 103.
27 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a).
28 United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
29 See generally, 107 CONG. REC. S10990 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001); 107 CONG.
REC. H7159 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2001).
30 USA PATRIOT Act § 223.
31 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a).
32 See infra Part III.C.
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law. A reasonable interpretation of the statute holds a local govern-
ment entity to be held civilly liable under 18 U.S.C. section 2520(a).
Part I133 of this Note will review the history of wiretapping in
the United States, beginning with the telegraph and judicial opin-
ions leading up to OCSA, and the post OCSA amendments dealing
with civil liability. Part II134 introduces the conflicting interpreta-
tions given to 18 U.S.C. section 2520(a) by federal courts since the
1986 ECPA amendments. Part IV35 argues for a reasonable inter-
pretation that should be applied to the current statute. Finally, Part
V 3 6 reviews the implications of proper interpretation of the statute
as it relates to the liability of local government entities.
II. WIRETAPPING IN THE UNITED STATES
The wiretapping laws in the United States began in the 1800's
with state laws prohibiting the interception of telegraphs37 and
evolved into complex federal38 and state statutes 39 governing al-
33 See infra Part II.-
34 See infra Part III.
35 See infra Part IV.
36 See infra Part V.
37 See infra note 63.
38 18 U.S.C. §§2510-2522 (2002).
39 This note is concerned solely with the federal wiretapping statute, how-
ever, it is important to note that forty-nine of the fifty states have wiretapping
statutes (Vermont does not). ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.310 (Michie 2001); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §13-3005 (West 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. §5-60-120 (Michie 2001);
CAL. PENAL CODE §632 (West 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. §18-9-303 (2001); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §53A-189 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. §11, 1336 (1995);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §934.03 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. §16-11-62 (2001); HAW.
REV. STAT. §803-42 (2001); IDAHO CODE §18-6701 (2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. §5/14-2 (West 2001); IND. CODE. ANN. §35-33.5-5-5 (Michie 2001); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §21-4002 (2001); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §526.020 (Banks-Baldwin
2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §15:1303 (WEST 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 15,
§710 (West 2001); MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §10-402 (2001); MASS.
ANN. LAWS CH. §272, 99(c)(1) (Law. Co-op. 2001); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§750.539c (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. §626A.02 (West 2001); Miss. CODE.
ANN. §41-29-533 (2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. §542-402 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. §45-
8-213 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. §86-702 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §200.620
(Michie 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §570-A:2 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§2A:156A-3 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-12-1 (Michie 2001); N.Y. PENAL
LAW §250.05 (Consol. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A-287 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE
§12.1-15-02 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2933.52 (Banks-Baldwin 2001); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, §176.3 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. §165.543 (2001); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §5703 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS §11.-35-21 (2001); S.C.
CODE ANN. §16-1.7-470 (Law. Co-op. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §23A-35A-20
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most all types of communications between individuals. With the ad-
vent of new technologies, Congress realized the necessity of
updating the laws in order to keep pace with the activities of crimi-
nal enterprises. 40 Wiretapping is one of the most effective weapons
in the war on organized crime.41 In order to deal with unauthorized
wiretapping, Congress included sections detailing criminal and civil
procedures for violations. 42
Police began tapping telephones as early as 1895, 43 and in 1985-
1995, law enforcement officials intercepted more than 12 million
conversations. 44 In 1995, more than four out of five conversations
intercepted were non-criminal, resulting in an average of 1,569 in-
nocent conversations intercepted per installed wiretap. 45 The aver-
age length of an intercept order has increased from an average of
twenty-one days in 1980 to an average of thirty-eight days in 1996.46
The average number of calls intercepted with each wiretap has also
(Michie 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. §39-13-601 (2001); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN.
ART. 18. §20 (West 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-9-403 (2001); VA. CODE ANN.
§19.2-62 (Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9.73.030 (West 2001); W. VA.
CODE §62-1D-3 (2001); Wis. STAT. ANN. §968.31 (West 2001); WYo STAT. ANN.
§7-3-602 (Michie 2001).
40 Robert W. Kastenmeier et al., Communications Privacy: A Legislative Per-
spective, Wis. L. REV. 715, 716 (1989).
41 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 123 (1967) (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting former District Attorney Frank S. Hogan) District Attorney Hogan testi-
fied that electronic surveillance is:
the single most valuable weapon in law enforcement's fight against
organized crime... It has permitted us to undertake major investi-
gations of organized crime. Without it, and I confine myself to top
figures in the underworld, my own office could not have convicted
Charles "Lucky" Luciano, Jimmy Hines, Louis "Lepke Buchalter,
Jacob "Gurrah" Shapiro, Joseph "Socks" Lanza, George Scalise,
Frank Erickson, John "Dio" Dioguardi, and Frank Carbo... Id.
42 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2002).
43 Big Brother in the Wires: Wiretapping in the Digital Age, ACLU SPECIAL
REPORT, (ACLU/Cyber-Liberties, New York, NY) Mar. 1998, available at http://
www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/wiretapbrother.html.
44 Id.
45 Bob Barr, A Tyrant's Toolbox: Technology and Privacy in America, 26 J.
LEGIs. 71, 75 (2000) (citing Robyn Blumner, Under Clinton, Government Is All
Ears, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Aug. 11, 1996, at 5B).
46 See Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the United States Courts, 1990 Wire-
tap Rep., at 29 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 Wiretap Rep.); Statistics Div., Admin. Of-
fice of the United States Courts,1996 Wiretap Rep., at 29 (1997) [hereinafter 1996
Wiretap Rep.].
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increased from 1,058 in 1980 to 1,969 in 1996.47 According to the
testimony of FBI agent James Kallstrom, from 1982-1992 more than
22,000 convictions resulted from court-authorized surveillances. 48
While wiretapping is an effective means of combating crime,
public acceptance of wiretapping is less than overwhelming. 49 In
1994, seventy-six percent of Americans disapproved of wiretapping
generally.50 The security concerns of a wiretap involve the right to
privacy of an innocent individual who happens to speak on the tele-
phone to someone under investigation. 5 ' The person who is not
under investigation is subjected to surveillance without any proba-
ble cause or suspicion of illegal activity.
52
Since 1968, the civil remedies provision5 3 of the OCSA has
been amended two times.54 As part of the ECPA in 1986, 55 Con-
gress amended the section, adding the words "or entity" after "per-
son" .56 In 2001, Congress further amended the section under the
USA PATRIOT Act 57 by adding "other than the United States"
after the word "entity".5 8 The civil remedies provision currently
states:
Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any per-
son whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in viola-
tion of this chapter may in a civil action recover from
the person or entity, other than the United States, which
engaged in that violation such relief as may be appro-
priate. (emphasis added) 59
47 1990 Wiretap Rep., supra note 46, at 29; 1996 Wiretap Rep., supra note 46,
at 29.
48 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Information Security
and Privacy in Network Environments, OTA-TCT-606.
49 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Department of Justice, Sourcebook of Crimi-
nal Justice Statistics 1995, at 168 (1996) (response to question: "Everything consid-
ered, would you say that you approve or disapprove of wiretapping?").
50 Id.
51 107 CONG. REC. S10990, Sl1001 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001)(statement of
Sen. Leahy).
52 Id.
53 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (2002).
54 See ECPA § 103; see USA PATRIOT Act §223.
55 ECPA § 103.
56 See infra Part III.C.
57 USA PATRIOT Act §223.
58 See infra Part III.D.
59 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a).
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A. History of Wiretapping in the United States
The underpinnings of the federal wiretapping law began in the
1800's with the invention of the telegraph, which literally used wires
to send communications. 60 Historically, the United States has been
uncomfortable with the notion of surveillance of the communica-
tions of private citizens. 61 When the telegraph first came to promi-
nence in the 1800's, the ability to tap the communications
developed as well.62 As early as 1862, California had a statute
prohibiting the interception of telegraph transmissions. 63 In 1864,
the statute was used to prosecute a stockbroker who obtained mar-
ket information through the interception of telegraph messages.64
As the country engaged in the Civil War, interception of military
messages sent via telegraph became a strategic necessity. 65 In fact,
General Jeb Stuart brought a personal wiretapper along with him in
the field.
66
In 1881, only five years after the invention of the telephone, a
patent was issued for a scrambler that thwarted telephone tap-
pers.67 Specifically, wiretapping of telephones was used in a fight
between two rival San Francisco papers. 68 In response to the skir-
mish between the newspapers, the California legislature extended
the 1862 statute to cover telephone conversations. 69
60 PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 110 (1995).
61 107 CONG. REC. S10990, S11016 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of
Sen. Graham on the USA PATRIOT Act).
For most of America's history, we have been extremely uncomfort-
able with the idea of clandestine intelligence. It ran contrary to our
basic spirit of national openness. While the British have had a well-
developed intelligence system since the Napoleonic wars, our first
adventure in this field really is a product of the Second World War,
and as soon as the war was over, the military intelligence services
were essentially collapsed. Id.
62 WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLIT-
ICS OF WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION, 154 (1998).
63 1862 CAL. STAT. 288.
64 See DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 62, at 155.
65 SAMUEL DASH ET AL. THE EAVESDROPPERS 23 (1959).
66 Id.
67 REGAN, supra note 60, at 110-111.
68 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 62, at 155. "In 1899, the San Francisco Call
accused a rival, the San Francisco Examiner, of wiretapping conversations between
the Call and its reporters and stealing the Call's exclusives." Id.
69 Id.
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The first police to tap telephones were in New York City in the
early 1890s.70 Although there was a state law prohibiting it, New
York City policemen believed that the statute did not apply to
them.71 The police and Western Union denied newspaper stories of
their wiretapping exploits. 72 However, in 1916 they admitted that
the police, with the assistance of the telephone company, were en-
gaged in wiretapping. 73 Their defense was that they did not under-
stand this to be in violation of any law.74 It was also discovered that
New York City's mayor authorized a wiretap on five Catholic
priests suspected of engaging in charity fraud.75
Congress finally addressed the issue during World War I with
the passage of the Anti-Wiretap Statute. 76 The statute created a
punishment of a $1,000 fine and jail term of up to one year for the
unlawful interception of wire communications. 77 Utilizing this Act,
the federal government found wiretapping especially effective in
apprehending violators of Prohibition.78 Wiretaps became increas-
ingly prevalent during Prohibition and thus set the stage for the Su-
preme Court to enter the wiretapping debate in the landmark case
of Olmstead v. United States.79
1. Olmstead v. United States
Roy Olmstead ran a $2 million per year bootlegging enterprise
in violation of the National Prohibition Act and was arrested based
on evidence obtained through wiretaps utilized by federal agents
without a warrant.80 Prohibition officers put wiretaps in the base-
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 DASH, supra note 65, at 25.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 26. The charges against the priests were dismissed by a Grand Jury
and the police officers who did the wiretapping were prosecuted but exonerated.
The mayor told a 1916 legislative committee, "Conviction on conviction has been
obtained which otherwise would have been impossible. The Baff murderers as well
as dozens of other criminals would still be at large, had the police not used this
means." Id.
76 Act of Oct. 29, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-230, 40 Stat. 1017 (1918). The Pream-
ble to the Act stated the purpose as "An Act Providing for the protection of users
of the telephone and telegraph service and the properties and funds belonging
thereto during Government operation and control." Id.
77 Id. at 1018.
78 DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 62, at 155.
79 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
80 Id. at 455; DIFFIE & LANDAU, supra note 62, at 156.
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ment of the office building from which Olmstead and others ran
their business.81 Phone taps were also placed in the homes of Olm-
stead and four co-defendants.82 Over a five-month period, federal
agents recorded 775 pages of typewritten notes from telephone con-
versations.83 The evidence in the record was 306 pages long, with
210 of those pages reciting details of the wiretap. 84
For consideration,' The Court certified constitutional issues in-
volving the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.85 The court observed
that, absent a violation of the Fourth Amendment, there was no
reason to consider the defendant's Fifth Amendment claim.86 Al-
though there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment, the court
briefly addressed the Fifth Amendment claim. 87 Because the defen-
dants were voluntarily conducting their business over their phone
lines, the Fifth Amendment did not apply. 88
Next, the Court looked to the history of the Fourth Amend-
ment as a bastion against the search and seizure of a person's prop-
erty against their will. 89 The Court distinguished past Fourth
Amendment cases 9° on the grounds that they involved physical en-
try into the private quarters of an individual. 91 Furthermore, as the
court pointed out, the Fourth Amendment is directed at "material
things - the person, the house, his papers or his effects.
92
The Amendment does not forbid what was done here.
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evi-
dence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing
81 ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL: FBI WIRETAPS, Bus, IN-
FORMERS, AND THE SUPREME COURT 18 (1992).
82 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 457.
83 CHARNS, supra note 81, at 18.
84 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 481.
85 Id. at 455.
86 Id. at 462.
87 Id. at 466-69.
88 Id. at 462.
89 Id. at 463. The Fourth Amendment was directed against things like gen-
eral warrants and writs of assistance, utilized by the British in colonial times as
invasions on individuals. Id.
90 The court cites to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877);
Silverthome Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924). Id. at 458-66.
91 Id. at 464.
92 Id.
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and that only. There was no entry of the houses or of-
fices of the defendants. 9
3
Due to the public nature of the national telephone system, the court
pointed out that telephone wires are not considered a part of a per-
son's home or office. 94 Even if the wires were part of the house, the
interception of the conversations did not take place in the defen-
dant's house.95 Because the majority held that there was no viola-
tion of Fourth Amendment protection from search and seizure, the
evidence obtained from the wiretaps was admissible against the de-
fendants. 96 The majority invited Congress to take up the admissibil-
ity issue in future legislation. 97
Justice Brandeis, in what has become a famous98 examination
of the constitutional underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment as
they relate to the right to privacy and wiretaps, dissented99 on the
grounds that the wiretaps constituted a search and seizure of an
individual. Brandeis noted that when the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments were adopted, the means by which an individual could be
searched were force and violence.100 As time went on, new ways of
invading an individual's privacy developed, ones that could go un-
detected by an individual. 0 1 In the case before the court, the defen-
93 Id.
94 Id. at 465. At the time, the telephone service in the United States was still
under exclusive control of the government. Id.
95 Id. at 466.
96 Id. at 468.
97 Id. at 465-66. "Congress may of course protect the secrecy of telephone
messages by making them, when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal
criminal trials, by direct legislation, and thus departs from the common law of evi-
dence." Id.
98 See supra p. 1 (opening paragraph); see also Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475-76
(quoting one of the most famous statements on wiretapping law, often quoted in
texts dealing with wiretapping).
99 The decision was 5-4, with Justices Holmes, Butler and Stone joining
Brandeis in dissent. While all four Justices filed dissenting opinions, Brandeis' has
become the famous statement on the right to privacy in this area. Olmstead, 277
U.S. at 471-485. In 1967, The Supreme Court would side with Justice Brandeis and
overrule Olmstead in Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see infra Part
I1.A.7.
100 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473.
101 Id. Brandeis elaborated:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means
of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some
day be developed by which the Government, without removing pa-
pers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by
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dants were completely unaware of any intrusion on their personal
conversations. 102
In an often-cited comparison, 10 3 Brandeis compared the fed-
eral mail system to telephone service. 104 Both are public services
furnished by the federal government, which are violated in similar
ways. 10 5 Traditionally, the Supreme Court has refused to use rigid,
literal readings of the Fourth Amendment. 10 6 According to Bran-
deis, the majority utilized a rigid interpretation when holding that
there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment. 0 7 Brandeis of-
fered the advice that the Court should take a broad view when ana-
lyzing the protection offered by the Fourth Amendment.
10 8
The next analogy drawn by Brandeis was to where an officer
reads a piece of paper without any physical seizure.109 Without even
touching the paper, the court has held that the officer's actions con-
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occur-
rences of the home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences
may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and
emotions. Id.
102 Id. at 457.
103 See supra pg. 1 (opening paragraph); see also Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475-
76.
104 See supra pg. 1 (opening paragraph); see also Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475-
76.
105 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475.
106 Id. at 476. For example, to take the Amendment literally, forcing an indi-
vidual to produce a document at a court proceeding is not a search or seizure, but
the Supreme Court has held that it is an illegal search or seizure when obtained
illegally. Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 478-79. In Brandeis' opinion:
The protection guaranteed by the Amendments is much broader in
scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure condi-
tions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the sig-
nificance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satis-
factions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every un-
justifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the in-
dividual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a
criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be
deemed a violation of the Fifth. Id.
109 Id. at 478.
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stitute a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, even
though no physical force is involved." 0 In a rebuttal of the major-
ity, Brandeis pointed out that it doesn't matter where the physical
connections of the phone wires were made1 ' or that the intrusions
were justified in the name of law enforcement, they still violated an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights. 1 2
In the eyes of the dissenters, the Court should have vacated the
convictions of the defendants who had not pled guilty." 3 Without
the notes and transcripts from the wiretaps, there was no evidence
of guilt." 4 Although the slim-majority of the court won the day, in
the end it would be the dissent's analysis that would lead to a com-
prehensive federal wiretapping statute in 1968.115
2. Nardone v. United States
In 1934 Congress enacted the Federal Communication Act,
which prohibited wiretapping and was utilized by the court to en-
force wiretapping violations." 6 In 1937, the Supreme Court con-
110 Id. See generally, Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921);
Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
I" Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 479.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 482.
114 Id.
115 See infra Part II.B.
116 FCA, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934):
§605. UNAUTHORIZED PUBLICATION OR USE OF COMMUNICATIONS
No person receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting, or assisting
in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized
channels of transmission or reception, to any person other than the
addressee, his agent, or attorney, to a person employed or author-
ized to forward such communication to its destination, to proper
accounting or distributing officers of the various communicating
centers over which the communication may be passed, to the
master of a ship under whom he is serving, in response to a sub-
poena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of
other lawful authority. No person not being authorized by the
sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person. No person not be-
ing entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate
or foreign communication by wire or radio and use such communi-
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fronted the issue of the admissibility of evidence from wiretaps
under the FCA in Nardone v. United States.' 17 The petitioners were
convicted of various counts of smuggling and possession of alcohol
and conspiracy to smuggle and possess alcohol. 118 Federal agents
tapped the telephone wires of the defendants and overheard their
communications.' 1 9 At trial, federal agents testified about the sub-
stance of the conversations intercepted via the wiretap.
120
The government argued that federal agents should not fall
under the definition of the word "person" under § 605.121 The argu-
ment was predicated on the canon of interpretation that a statute's
general words, absent a clear indication from Congress, do not ap-
ply to the government. 122 Despite these arguments, the court held,
"Taken at face value the phrase 'no person' comprehends federal
agents, and the ban on communication to 'any person' bars testi-
mony to the content of an intercepted message. ' 123 On remand, the
petitioners were found guilty in a decision 2 4 that was once again
appealed and ended up before the U.S. Supreme Court.
125
cation (or any information therein contained) for his own benefit
or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto. No person having
received any intercepted communication or having become ac-
quainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of such communication (or any part thereof) knowing that such
communication was so obtained, shall divulge or publish the exis-
tence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such com-
munication (or any part thereof) or use such communication (or
any information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the
benefit of another not entitled thereto. This section shall not apply
to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of
any radio communication which is transmitted by any station for
the use of the general public, which relates to ships in distress, or
which is transmitted by an amateur radio station operator or by a
citizens band radio operator. Id.
117 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
118 Id. at 380.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 383
122 Id.
123 Id. at 381. Justice Sutherland dissented, arguing that the word "person"
did not include an officer of the federal government engaged in a criminal investi-
gation. He worried that the majority's decision would offer further protection to
criminals by affording them the comfort in knowing that they can plan their crimes
over the phone, and if in fact their conversations are intercepted, they may not be
used against them. Id.
124 Nardone v. United States, 106 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1939).
125 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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Upon remand to the trial court, the defendants were con-
victed. 126 They appealed on the grounds that the prosecutor utilized
information learned from the wiretaps. 127 Defendants argued that
because the wiretap evidence was inadmissible, the prosecutor
could not use it in the trial, even as secondary evidence. 128 Before
the Supreme Court was the issue of whether the improperly ob-
tained information could be used as secondary evidence at the
trial. 2 9 The Supreme Court held that to forbid the use of the evi-
dence directly, but to allow it to be introduced indirectly, was "de-
structive of individual liberty." 130 The Court said the information
was admissible if learned from an independent source, but not
when derived from illegal wiretaps. 131
3. Goldman v. United States
Due to a lack of enforcement of the laws, wiretapping was very
prevalent in the 1940's.132 With the United States engaged in World
War II, many soldiers were trained to be wiretappers so they could
intercept messages in combat zones. 133 Some former World War II
wiretappers even parlayed their experience into successful post-war
careers for private gain.134
A 1940 congressional investigation prompted the committee's
counsel to say, "Innumerable circumstances have been discovered
where telephone wires of public officials and private individuals
have been tapped . . . at the instance of men holding high public
office for no discernible reason other than that of purely personal
gain."' 135 President Franklin D. Roosevelt authorized wiretapping of
individuals who were believed to be subversive upon approval of
the U.S. Attorney General. 136 A Department of Treasury's wiretap-
per approximated that he installed over 10,000 wiretaps between
1934 and 1948.137
126 Id. at 339.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 340.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 341
132 DASH, supra note 65, at 30.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 31.
136 REGAN, supra note 60, at 115.
137 HERMAN SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE 9 (1977).
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The Supreme Court next confronted the Federal Communica-
tions Act in 1942.138 In Goldman v. United States, 39 with the assis-
tance of the building's superintendent, two federal agents gained
night access to the office of petitioner and a neighboring office.
40
They installed a listening device in order to eavesdrop on a meeting
in the office the next day.' 41 When they attempted to listen, the
device did not work.142 The agents proceeded to use another device
that, when pressed up against the wall, could pick up the sounds in
the next room. 143 With this device, they overheard the meeting and,
with the help of a stenographer, transcribed what they heard.144 The
eavesdropping occurred on multiple occasions and even picked up
conversations petitioner had in his office on the telephone.1 45 When
petitioner learned of this eavesdropping, which was to be used at an
upcoming trial, they moved to suppress the evidence because it vio-
lated the FCA.' 46 Specifically, the petitioner contested the admissi-
bility of the telephone conversations he had in his office which were
transcribed.1 4
7
The Court held that there was no violation of the FCA for the
overhearing and transcribing of what was said into the petitioner's
phone receiver.148 Under the statute, there were two requirements
for a violation: a communication and an interception. 149 The Court
found there was no communication for the purposes of the FCA
because the agents heard only half the conversation on the phone,
and they only heard it because of their proximity to the peti-
tioner.' 50 The lack of an interception within the meaning of the
FCA was due to the fact that the agents did not actually tap the
telephone wire, but only heard the petitioner's half of the conversa-
tion spoken into the telephone receiver.151 Although it was con-
ceded that the conversations were thought by petitioners to be
138 FCA, 47 U.S.C. §605 (1934).
139 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).




144 Id. at 131-32.
145 Id. at 132.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 133.
149 FCA, 47 U.S.C. §605 (1934).
150 Goldman, 316 U.S. at 133.
151 Id.
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secret and confidential, the statute examines the means of commu-
nication, not the perceived secrecy of the conversation.1 52
The Court drew an analogy to someone writing down a mes-
sage to be transmitted by telegraph. 153 The words written on the
paper would not be covered by the FCA until the paper is given to
the telegraph company and sent through the wire system.154 The
words spoken into a telephone receiver in the presence of another
person are not a communication under the FCA until they are
transmitted via a telephone wire. 55
Petitioner also claimed trespass based on the installation of the
listening device. 156 The Court agreed that the first device installed
was a trespass, but because the device was not actually used, it was
not at issue in this case. 157 If it had been used, a continuous trespass
may have been sustainable. 158 The Supreme Court, as well as the
lower courts, found that the installation of the first device was a
trespass, however, because it did not "materially enhance" the abil-
ity of the agents to overhear the conversations on the telephone, it
was not a violation of the FCA.159
Petitioners urged a violation based on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 60 but recognized that such a holding would not be consistent
with Olmstead. 161 Therefore, petitioner argued that the actions of
the agents could be distinguished. 162 The Court rejected the peti-
tioners' argument that Olmstead'only extends to tapping of tele-
phone lines. 163 Petitioner attempted to show that Olmstead would
not extend to a conversation contained within an office that was
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 133. The court also compared the situation to letters deposited in the
U.S. Postal System, which are protected from examination. But the court noted
that the office carbon copy of the letters would not be protected by the same logic
as they were never transmitted through the mail system. Id.
155 Id. The court compared the agents listening in the next room to an indi-
vidual who was sitting in the room with the petitioner at the time. Therefore, there
was not violation for someone casually overhearing a phone conversation. Id.
156 Id. at 134.




161 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see supra Part II.A.1.
162 Goldman, 316 U.S. at 135.
163 Id.
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spoken into a phone receiver. 164 The Court also rejected petition-
ers' explicit request to overrule Olmstead.
165
4. Irvine v. United States
Twelve years later, the Court was again confronted with a sus-
picious wiretap in Irvine v. California.166 The police were suspicious
of petitioner engaging in illegal bookmaking and decided to plant a
concealed microphone in his house. 167 One day, while Irvine and
his wife were gone, the police had a locksmith go to the house and
make a key.168 Two days later, the police entered the house and
planted a concealed microphone in the hall. 169
Any sounds picked up by the microphone were sent to a neigh-
boring garage where officers could listen. 170 A few days later, when
Irvine was gone, the police entered the house again and moved the
microphone to the bedroom. 171 Two weeks after that, the police
moved the microphone to a closet.1 72 At the trial, the police officers
testified as to what they heard through the aid of the
microphone.173
The Court began by noting that this was not a case of conven-
tional wiretapping as there was no connection to any communica-
tion system in petitioner's house. In fact, what was heard on the
microphone is no different from what might have been heard if the
officer was eavesdropping by hiding in the closet. Citing to Nar-
done174 and Goldman, 75 the court held that there was no violation
164 Id.
165 Id. at 136. In their concurrence, Chief Justice Stone and Justice Frank-
furter said:
Had a majority of the Court been willing at this time to overrule
the Olmstead case, we should have been happy to join them. But as
they have declined to do so, and as we think this case is indistin-
guishable in principle from Olmstead's, we have no occasion to re-
peat here the dissenting views in that case with which we agree.
166 Id. 128 (1954).






173 Id. at 131.
174 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939); see supra Part II.A.2.
175 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); see supra Part II.A.3.
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of the FCA because of the lack of a communication system
involved.1
76
The entries into the house without a search warrant were
clearly a trespass. 177 However, The Court cited to Wolf v. Colo-
rado178 for the proposition that, "the Fourteenth Amendment does
not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable
search and seizure."'' 79 While the court allowed the admission of the
evidence, it pointed out that the actions of the officers were repre-
hensible and other remedies were available to petitioner against the
officers. 180
5. Silverman v. United States
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court, in Silverman v.
United States,18' distinguished Goldman'82 and began to set the
stage for the 1968 revisions to the wiretapping statute. 183 In the
spring of 1958, the District of Columbia police suspected the prem-
ises of the petitioner were a gambling headquarters. 184 The owner
of an adjacent empty house granted the police permission to use the
house as an "observation post."1 85 The police used a "spike
mike" 186 to eavesdrop on the petitioner.1 87
176 Irvine, 347 U.S. at 131.
177 Id. at 132.
178 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
179 Id. at 33.
180 Irvine, 347 U.S. at 137.
181 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
182 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); see supra Part II.A.3.
183 OCSA, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (1968).
184 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 506.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 506-07. The court describes a spike mike:
The instrument in question was a microphone with a spike about a
foot long attached to it, together with an amplifier, a power pack,
and earphones. The officers inserted the spike under a baseboard in
a second-floor room of the vacant house and into a crevice ex-
tending several inches into the party wall, until the spike hit some-
thing solid "that acted as a very good sounding board." The record
clearly indicates that the spike made contact with a heating duct
serving the house occupied by the petitioners, thus converting their
entire heating system into a conductor of sound. Conversations tak-
ing place on both floors of the house were audible to the officers
through the earphones, and their testimony regarding those conver-
sations, admitted at the trial over timely objection, played a sub-
stantial part in the petitioners' convictions. Id.
187 Id. at 506.
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The Court agreed with the Circuit Court of Appeals1 88 that the
FCA was inapplicable as there was no communication intercepted
by the wiretap. 189 Similar to the Goldman case, what was overheard
was the conversation before it entered the wire system of the tele-
phone company. Petitioners argued that the court should recon-
sider Goldman and Olmstead' 90 due to new technologies now
available to law enforcement officials.' 91 The Court declined to re-
consider Goldman or Olmstead, but found those cases to be distin-
guishable. 92 Whereas in the other cases there was incidental
intrusion into the homes of the person,19 3 In this case, there was a
full-blown trespass.'9 4 The officers essentially took control of an in-
tegral part of the house, the heating system, without the knowledge
or consent of the petitioners. 95 The Court held that this was clearly
a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 196
6. Berger v. New York
In 1938, the New York Constitution was amended to permit
wiretapping in New York, 197 and the criminal procedure statutes
were amended to reflect the change. 198 The statute was challenged
as unconstitutional under the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth
188 Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
189 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 507.
190 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see supra, Part II.A.1.
191 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 508-09. Although not cited to by the petitioner, this
is similar to the argument of Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Olmstead where he
warned of the advent of new technologies available to law enforcement officials
that would allow eavesdropping without any physical presence noticeable to an
individual. Id.
192 Id. at 512.
193 See supra Parts II.A.1., II.A.3. In Goldman, there had been a prior physi-
cal entry into the petitioner's office in order to implant a listening device that later
was found to be ineffective. The court held that the invasion has not been helpful
to the federal agents in their eavesdropping on a phone conversation. Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). In Olmstead, the only invasion on the property
was made without any trespassing on the defendant's property. The wiretaps were
set up in the basement of a large office building and the wiretaps on the homes
were made in the streets near the houses. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928).
194 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 512.
197 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12
198 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
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Amendments in Berger v. New York. 199 The New York Appellate
Division upheld the statute as constitutional.20° The Court of Ap-
peals agreed, but was closely divided.201 The U.S. Supreme Court
found that the statute's language provided for a procedure that was
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable interception of tele-
phone and telegraph communications shall not be violated, and ex parte orders or
warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is reasonable ground
to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the partic-
ular means of communication, and particularly describing the person or persons
whose communications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof. Id.
N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS ANN., CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 813-a (McKinney 1944).
§ 813-A. Ex PARTE ORDER FOR EAVESDROPPING
An ex parte order for eavesdropping as defined in subdivisions one
and two of section seven hundred thirty-eight of the penal law may
be issued by any justice of the supreme court or judge of a county
court or of the court of general sessions of the county of New York
upon oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or of the attorney-
general or of an officer above the rank of sergeant of any police
department of the state or of any political subdivision thereof, that
there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be
thus obtained, and particularly describing the person or persons
whose communications, conversations or discussions are to be
overheard or recorded and the purpose thereof, and, in the case of
telegraphic or telephonic communication, identifying the particular
telephone number or telegraph line involved. In connection with
the issuance of such an order the justice or judge may examine on
oath the applicant and any other witness he may produce and shall
satisfy himself of the existence of reasonable grounds for the grant-
ing of such application. Any such order shall be effective for the
time specified therein but not for a period of more than two
months unless extended or renewed by the justice or judge who
signed and issued the original order upon satisfying himself that
such extension or renewal is in the public interest. Any such order
together with the papers upon which the application was based,
shall be delivered to and retained by the applicant as authority for
the eavesdropping authorized therein. A true copy of such order
shall at all times be retained in his possession by the judge or justice
issuing the same, and, in the event of the denial of an application
for such an order, a true copy of the papers upon which the applica-
tion was based shall in like manner be retained by the judge or
justice denying the same. Id.
199 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
200 Berger v. New York, 25 A.D.2d 718 (1966).
201 People v. Berger, 18 N.Y.2d 638 (1966).
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too broad in result and ran afoul of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
202
Berger was convicted of conspiracy to bribe the Chairman of
the New York State Liquor Authority. 20 3 The eavesdrop order was
obtained from the State Supreme Court to install a recording device
in two offices.204 After approximately two weeks, a conspiracy was
uncovered and Berger was indicted as a "go-between" for the prin-
cipal conspirators. 20 5 The District Attorney's Office later admitted
that, without the information obtained from the eavesdropping,
they did not have enough information to indict Berger. 20 6
The Court noted that the statute's procedure of petitioning a
judicial officer satisfied the Fourth Amendment requirement of a
neutral and detached authority to be placed between the police and
the public. 20 7 Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant may be is-
sued upon probable cause and a particular description of the place,
persons or things to be searched. 20 8 Under the New York law, the
particularity element was missing because the statute only required
a "reasonable ground" to believe that evidence of a crime could be
obtained by the use of a wiretap.2 0 9 The Court analogized the war-
rants available under the statute to the general warrants utilized in
Britain, whose elimination in the United States was a motivation
behind the passage of the Fourth Amendment.210
The Court found four main areas where the statute offended
the Constitution. 211 First, the statute lacked the particularity re-
quired by the Fourth Amendment. 2 2 Second, the statute allowed
202 Berger, 388 U.S. at 54.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 45.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 54.
208 Id. at 55. As the Supreme Court said in Osborn v. United States, the "in-
discriminate use of such devices in law enforcement raises grave constitutional
questions under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments" and imposes "a heavier re-
sponsibility on this Court in its supervision of the fairness of procedures." 385 U.S.
323, 329 n.7 (1966).
209 Berger, 388 U.S. at 55-56.
210 Id. at 58. "New York's broadside authorization rather than being 'care-
fully circumscribed' so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of privacy actually
permits general searches by electronic devices, the truly offensive character of
which was first condemned in Entick v. Carrington, and which were then known as
'general warrants.'" (internal citations omitted). Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 58-59.
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continuous searches for two months213 without any probable
cause. 214 The only requirement was a "reasonable ground" as the
basis for authorization of the intrusion. 215 Third, there was no ter-
mination date for the eavesdropping once the communication was
seized.21 6 The termination of the wiretap was left to the sole discre-
tion of the police officer.217 Finally, there was no requirement of
notice, as there would be for a conventional warrant.218 Further-
more, the statute did not contain a provision to show special cir-
cumstances for the unconsented entry.219 As the court concluded,
"Our concern with the statute here is whether its language permits
a trespassory invasion of the home or office, by general warrant,
contrary to the command of the Fourth Amendment. As it is writ-
ten, we believe that it does.
220
The outcome in Berger, along with Katz v. United States,
221
motivated the legislature to codify the Fourth Amendment protec-
tions available to citizens who are subjected to a wiretap. Whereas
in 1928 the Supreme Court found no Fourth Amendment concerns
over wiretaps that did not physically intrude on an individual, forty
years later the Court had come full-circle and recognized the con-
cerns of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead.
7. Katz v. United States
The final judicial statement on wiretapping prior to the enact-
ment of the new wiretapping statute222 came in 1967 in Katz v.
United States. 223 Looking back over the Court's decisions in Olin-
stead224 and Goldman,225 the court decided to abandon the "tres-
213 Id. at 59. (noting the statute also allowed a two-month extension of the
wiretap on a showing that it is in the public interest, therefore, the wiretap could







220 Id. at 63.
221 See supra Part II.A.7.
222 OSCA, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (1968).
223 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
224 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see supra Part II.A.1.
225 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); see supra Part II.A.3.
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pass" doctrine of those cases.226 In Katz, the Court invalidated the
surveillance based on the failure to follow proper procedure.
2 7
The petitioner was convicted for using a telephone to transmit
wagering information from California to Miami and Boston.228 FBI
agents attached an electronic listening device to the outside of a
public telephone booth from which petitioner made his calls. 229 The
listening device did not actually enter the telephone booth in order
to record the conversations. 230 At his trial, the FBI agents testified
regarding what they heard through the device.231 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's contention that the FBI vio-
lated his Fourth Amendment rights because "there was no physical
entrance into the area occupied by [the petitioner].
' 232
The Supreme Court began by pointing out that the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. 233 The government argued
that because the telephone booth's walls are made of glass, the peti-
tioner would not have any expectation of privacy.234 The govern-
ment argued that because the public can see the petitioner on the
phone, there can be no privacy right attached.235 The Court disre-
garded this argument because while he can be seen, the petitioner
would enter the glass walled phone booth and close the door be-
hind him in order to shelter his conversation from others.236 The
glass walls and door act to protect his Fourth Amendment right by
shielding conversations from a person walking by on the street.2 37
In abandoning the holdings of Olmstead and Goldman, the
Court said the fact that the device used by the FBI did not pene-
226 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
227 Id. at 356-57.
228 Id. at 348.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 348.
231 Id.
232 Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966).
233 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The Court stated that, "What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not the subject of Fourth
Amendment protection ... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." (internal citations
omitted). Id.
234 Id. at 352.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 352. Other places where one retains the Fourth Amendment protec-
tion are a business office, see Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1920); a friend's apartment, see Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); a
taxicab, see Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
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trate the walls of the phone booth had no constitutional signifi-
cance.238 Next the Court considered the Constitutional implications
of the search and seizure. 239 The Court noted that the procedure
used by the FBI was correct in all but one way. 240 Because they did
not get approval from a proper magistrate to engage in the wiretap-
ping, their actions ran afoul of the Constitution.241 The necessary
component is the restraint imposed by a judicial officer, which is
manifested through a warrant in order to guarantee compliance
with the Fourth Amendment.242 The government argued for an ex-
ception for surveillance of a public telephone booth, but the Court
was unwilling to extend such an authorization.243 From Justice
Harlan's concurrence, the majority adopted a two-part test for
when an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
244
However, the court did not examine the economic implications of
their decision.245
238 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
239 Id. at 354. The FBI agents did not begin surveillance until they had estab-
lished a strong probability that he was engaged in criminal behavior. Even then,
they took pains to only eavesdrop on the conversations of petitioner at the tele-
phone booth and not of other citizens who used the booth. Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 356-57.
243 Id. at 358.
244 Id. at 361. Justice John Marshall Harlan explained the twofold rule that
had emerged.
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior deci-
sions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable." Id.
245 Richard Posner argues an economic justification for the Katz decision is
that people would incur more costs to switch to more secure forms of communica-
tion. If people do not have an expectation of privacy when they step inside a public
telephone booth and close the door, they will be forced to find other ways to com-
municate via the telephone. If their home and office phones have already been the
subjects of a wiretap, they are forced to seek out new and emerging technologies in
order to satisfy their communication demands. The costs in constantly seeking out
new technologies that can baffle law enforcement are the economic justification
presented by Posner. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 747 (5th
ed. 1998).
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B. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
After a forty-year evolution, the Supreme Court came full cir-
cle from Olmstead246 to Katz.247 Where the court once stressed the
lack of a physical invasion did not rise to the level of a violation of
the Fourth Amendment,248 now it was clear from Katz that the in-
trusion did need not be physical.2 49 With a clear statement of the
Fourth Amendment protections required for a wiretap, the gauntlet
had been laid down for Congress to codify the Court's holdings. 250
When an increasing number of abuses came to light in the
1960's, President Lyndon B. Johnson suspended all electronic sur-
veillance in all non-national security cases25' and reiterated this sus-
pension in his 1967 State of the Union address.25 2 In 1967, Professor
G. Robert Blakey, a central figure in the drafting of the 1968 fed-
eral wiretapping statute, testified before a Congressional
committee:253
The normal criminal situation deals with an inci-
dent, a murder, a rape, or a robbery, probably commit-
ted by one person. The criminal investigation normally
moves from the known crime to the unknown criminal.
This is in sharp contrast to the type of procedures you
must use in the investigation of organized crime. Here
in many situations you have known criminals but un-
known crimes.
So it is necessary to subject the known criminals to
surveillance, that is, to monitor their activities. It is
246 See supra Part II.A.1.
247 See supra Part II.A.7.
248 See supra Part II.A.1.
249 See supra Part II.A.7.
250 The Supreme Court, as early as Olmstead, invited Congressional action in
this area. See supra note 97.
251 SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, at 11; REGAN, supra note 60, at 120.
252 REGAN, supra note 60, at 123. In his State of the Union Address, Presi-
dent Johnson announced:
We should protect what Justice Brandeis called the "right most val-
ued by civilized men" - the right of privacy. We should outlaw all
wire-tapping - public and private - wherever and whenever it oc-
curs, except when the security of the nation is at stake - and only
then with the strictest safeguards. We should exercise the full reach
of our Constitutional powers to outlaw "bugging" and "snooping."
Id
253 SCHWARTZ, supra note 137, at 11.
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necessary to identify their criminal and noncriminal as-
sociates; it is necessary to identify their areas of opera-
tion, both legal and illegal. Strategic intelligence
attempts to paint this broad, overall picture of the
criminal's activities in order that an investigator can ul-
timately move in with a specific criminal investigation
and prosecution.
254
As a response, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.255 The Act codified the Fourth
Amendment search and seizure protections laid out by the Su-
preme Court while balancing many competing interests.256 There
were four basic elements contained in the statute: "prohibitions
against unreasonable surveillance by technological devices; excep-
tions for legitimate private use of surveillance devices; a system of
court-controlled use by law enforcement officials in certain cases;
assorted remedies providing for private and public enforcement of
statutory limitations. ' 257 The foundations were based on Congress'
commerce power due to the interstate nature of the
communications. 258
The Preamble states that the purpose of the Act is,
To assist State and local government in reducing the
incidence of crime, to increase the effectiveness, fair-
ness, and coordination of law enforcement and crimi-
nal justice systems at all levels of government and for
other purposes. 259
The Act was intended to deal with all forms of electronic eaves-
dropping, whether public or private.260 Another purpose behind the
enactment of the bill was to create civil and criminal punishments
against individuals who violated the electronic surveillance laws.261
254 Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 957-58 (1967).
255 OCSA, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (1968).
256 REGAN, supra note 60, at 124.
257 JURIS CEDERBAUMS, WIRETAPPING AND ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING:
THE LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 21 (1969).
258 Id.
259 OCSA § 803.
260 CEDERBAUMS, supra note 257, at 21.
261 107 CONG. REC. S10990, S10994 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001)(statement of
Sen. Leahy).
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However, the Act was only to be used for serious crimes. 262 The
original list consisted of twenty-six crimes, but as of 1996 that list
had been expanded to ninety-five.
263
Along with application in the criminal context, Congress also
extended the wiretap prohibitions to civil actions by individuals in
section 2520,264 authorizing the recovery of civil damages. The stat-
ute contemplated a civil action against a person who violated the
provisions and disclosed the contents of the information received
from a wiretap. 265 The classic example is a person who works for a
telephone switchboard and discloses the contents of a conversation
heard while working, Furthermore, the statute allowed for a civil
remedy against an individual officer or agent as noted by the Su-
preme Court in Irvine.
266
C. 1986 Amendment Adding "Or Entity" to §2520(a)
The central motivation for amending the federal wiretapping
statute in 1986 was in order to add wireless voice communications
and electronic communications to the scope of the statute.267 In ad-
ding new communications to the scope of federal legislation, Con-
262 OCSA § 803.
263 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2001).
264 Id. at §2520.
§ 2520. Recovery of civil damages authorized
Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, dis-
closed, or used in violation of this chapter shall (1) have a civil
cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or
uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use
such communications, and (2) shall be entitled to recover from any
such person-
(a) actual damages but not less than liquidated damages computed
at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation or $1,000 which-
ever is higher;
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred.
A good faith reliance on a court order or on the provisions of sec-
tion 2518(7) of this chapter shall constitute a complete defense to
any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter. Id.
265 Id.
266 See supra Part II.A.4.
267 "The Federal wiretap statute had been limited to voice communications,
ECPA extended the wiretap provisions to include wireless voice communications
and electronic communications such as email or other computer-to-computer
transmissions." H.R. REP. No. 106-932 (2000).
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gress was careful to protect individual privacy as well. 268 Senator
Leahy pointed out that the new technologies "left communications
privacy law where Einstein's insight left Newtonian physics. '269 But
Congress also realized the importance of supporting the develop-
ment of new technologies while attempting to reassure consumers
they could trust their personal privacy to emerging technologies. 270
The House of Representatives was clear about the nature of the
problem.
Although it is still not twenty years old, the Wiretap
Act was written in different technological and regula-
tory era. Communications were almost exclusively in
the form of transmission of the human voice over com-
mon carrier networks. Moreover, the contents of a
traditional telephone call disappeared once the words
transmitted were spoken and there were no records
kept. Consequently the law primarily protects against
the aural interception of the human voice over com-
mon carrier networks.
The legislation did not attempt to address the intercep-
tion of text, digital or machine communication. This
statutory framework appears to leave unprotected an
important sector of the new communications
technologies. 271
The deficiency in the law created an area of communications
for which regulations were not enforceable. 272 It offered an entire
arena where government surveillance could go completely un-
268 Id.
ECPA was intended to reestablish the balance between privacy and
law enforcement, which Congress found had been upset to the det-
riment of privacy by the development of communications and com-
puter technology and changes in the structure of the
telecommunications industry. Among the developments noted by
Congress were "large-scale electronic mail operations, cellular and
cordless phones, paging devices, miniaturized transmitters for radio
surveillance, and a dazzling array of digitized networks." Privacy,
Congress concluded, was in danger of being gradually eroded as
technology advanced. (internal citations omitted). Id.
269 Bill Unveiled to Patch Data Holes in Privacy Law, WASH. NEWSLETrER
(data communications), Oct. 1985, at 25.
270 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
271 H. REP. No. 99-647, at 17 (1986).
272 Id. at 19.
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checked. 273 Prior to 1986, the federal wiretapping statute only al-
lowed for a civil cause of action for the interception or use of a wire
or oral communication.2 74 The 1986 Amendments, 275 entitled the
"Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986" ("ECPA"),
2 76
were intended to expand the scope of violations of personal pri-
vacy.277 In the 1980's, the use of computers became more prevalent,
and Congress realized the importance of adding communications
via computer to the scope of the federal wiretapping statute.278 Fur-
thermore, the amendments increased the amount of damages under
the statute and added a statute of limitations.279 Finally, Congress
was careful to guard against any erosion of personal privacy to the
technological advances of the day.
2 80
273 Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme
Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 173, 176 (1979)(quoted in H. REP. No. 99-647 at 18-19
(1986).) Richard A. Posner explained the problem in 1979 (in a statement adopted
into the House Report):
In the absence of market discipline, there is no presumption that
the government wills strike an appropriate balance between disclo-
sure and confidentiality. And the enormous power of the govern-
ment makes the potential consequences of its snooping into
people's private lives far more ominous than those of snooping by a
private individual or firm. Id.
274 REGAN, supra note 60, at 129.
275 ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 103, 100 Stat. 1848 (1968):
Section 2520 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as
follows:
§ 2520. RECOVERY OF CIVIL DAMAGES AUTHORIZED
(a) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii),
any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is inter-
cepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter
may in a civil action recover from the person or entity which en-
gaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate. Id.
276 Id.
277 The ECPA expanded the possible violations by redefining the communica-
tions covered by the Act and also what has been done with the communications.
ECPA expands the definition of communications to include electronic communica-
tions. Also, prior law provided for a violation only upon interception of a commu-
nication. After the 1986 amendments, a violation can also occur when the
communications are intercepted or willfully used. Finally, the amendments revised
the amount of damages which may be recovered from a civil cause of action. Sum-
mary, H.R. 4952, 99th Cong. (2d Sess. 1986).
278 REGAN, supra note 60, at 129.
279 ECPA § 103.
280 H. REP. No. 99-647, at 19 (1986).
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The legislative history was silent about the specific addition of
"entity" to section 2520(a).281 The legislative history relating to sec-
tions 2511 and 2520 is detailed, but is silent as to the reason behind
the addition of "entity". 28 2 The ECPA also added the word "entity"
to section 2707(a), which deals with civil liability for interception of
stored wire and electronic communications.283 Both the Senate 284
and House285 reports for section 2707 specifically state that the
word "entity" includes government entities.286
Prior to the ECPA amendments, a plain meaning interpreta-
tion of the civil remedies provision would exclude a governmental
entity from liability. 287 Prior case law had indicated that "person"
had been interpreted to include business entities as well as natural
persons based upon the definition in section 2510(6).288 The ques-
tion still remained as to whether a government entity fell under the
ambit of "person or entity".289
281 Id. at 50. The legislative history to subsection (a) states:
Proposed subsection (a) authorizes the commencement of a civil
suit. The plaintiff may bring a civil action under Section 2520
whether or not the defendant has been subject to a criminal prose-
cution for the acts complained of; but in the absence of such prose-
cution and conviction, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish that
the requirements of this section are met. Id.
282 .1986 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 3555-3606.
283 ECPA § 201.
284 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 43 (1986).
Subsection (a) of this proposed section provides that, except as pro-
vided in subsection (e), any provider of electronic communication
service, subscriber, or customer of such service aggrieved by any
violation of this new chapter may recover from any person or en-
tity-including governmental entities-who knowingly or intention-
ally violated this chapter.(emphasis added). Id.
285 H. REP. No. 99-647, at 74 (1986).
Subsection (a) provides a civil cause of action for any subscriber or
customer who has been aggrieved by a knowing or intentional vio-
lation of this chapter. Recovery may be had under this section
against a person or entity who violated the provisions of this chap-
ter. This includes governmental entities who have violated the provi-
sions of this chapter. (emphasis added). Id.
286 Id.; S. REP. No. 99-541 at 43.
287 See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2001); see also supra Part II.B.
288 Conner v. Tate, 130 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2001)(citing Bodunde
v. Parizek, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7365 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Smith v. Hartford, 2000
Conn. Super LEXIS 1847 (Conn. Super. 2000); Dorris v. Absher, 959 F.Supp. 813
(M.D. Tenn. 1997)).
289 See infra Part III.
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D. 2001 Amendment Adding "Other than the United States"
to §2520(a)
In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the
United States, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001.290 The Act, among other provisions, modified 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 2520(a) to add the words "other than the United States".
91
There were many different motivations behind the enactment of the
USA PATRIOT Act,2 9 2 including combating terrorism on the state
and local government level.293 To accomplish this, the Senate en-
hanced the legislation in ten areas to improve upon the Bush Ad-
ministration's original proposal.294 In general, the concerns focused
on whether the bill over-expanded the authority of the government
for surveillance,295 but one of the improvements of the bill was an
inherent check on the power of the government.296 Another limita-
290 See generally USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
291 Id. at § 223.
292 See generally, 107 CONG. REC. S10990 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001); 107 CONG.
REC. H7159 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2001).
293 See generally, 107 CONG. REC. S10990, H7159.
294 107 CONG. REC. S10990, 10991 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001)(statement of Sen.
Leahy). Senator Leahy laid out the ten improvements in his speech before the
senate.
We improved security on the Northern Border;
We added money laundering;
We added programs to enhance information sharing and coordina-
tion with State and local law enforcement grants to State and local
governments to respond to bioterrorism, and to increase payments
to families of fallen firefighters, police officers and other public
safety workers;
We added humanitarian relief to immigrant victims of the Septem-
ber 11 terrorist attacks;
We added help to the FBI to hire translators;
We added more comprehensive victims assistance;
We added measures to fight cybercrime;
We added measures to fight terrorism against mass transportation
systems;
We added important measures to use technology to make our bor-
ders more secure;
Finally, and most importantly, we were able to include additional
important checks on the proposed expansion of government pow-
ers contained in the Attorney General's initial proposal. Id.
295 Id.
296 Id. at S10990.
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tion upon the bill was the "sunset" provision that gives the statute
four years of effect before Congress reconsiders it.297
The original proposal from the Bush Administration focused
solely on the federal government.298 Congress recognized the need
to include state and local government in the war on terrorism and
modified the bill to include them accordingly. 299 The challenge in
the enactment of the bill was to protect the securities and liberties
of citizens while providing tools to the law enforcement community
for the enhanced investigation of terrorism. 300 The Preamble to the
Act stated its purpose as "To deter and punish terrorist acts in the
United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement
investigatory tools, and for other purposes. '301
The specific amendments to section 2520(a) were not included
in the original proposal from the Bush Administration. 30 2 The
amendment was included by the House
to create civil liability for violations, including unau-
thorized disclosures, by law enforcement authorities of
the electronic surveillance procedures set forth in title
18, United States Code, or FISA information. The
amendment also requires administrative discipline of
officials who engage in such unauthorized
disclosures.303
The legislative history is silent, however, on the addition of the
words "other than the United States" to section 2520(a). 30 4 It ap-
pears that the section was added to protect against the disclosure of
information obtained from wiretaps of individuals believed to be
engaged in terrorist activities. The focus of the legislative history is
on the addition of administrative discipline of officials under the
newly amended section.30 5
297 Id. at S11026.
298 Id. at S10995.
299 Id.
300 Id. at S10990, S10998.
301 USA PATRIOT Act pmbl.
302 107 CONG. REC. S10990, S11007 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001)(statement of
Sen. Leahy).
303 Id.
304 See id. at S10990.
305 Id.
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III. AMBIGUITIES OVER THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
WORD "PERSON"
Courts have said that when interpreting the meaning of a stat-
ute, the first place to look is the face of the statute.30 6 Where the
language of a statute is ambiguous, the Court may look at the legis-
lative history and the overall statutory scheme to glean the proper
meaning. 307 There is no scientific formula to use when interpreting
a statute. When interpreting the meaning of 18 U.S.C. section
2520(a), courts have utilized both of these approaches.
A. Legislative History is Silent as to Application to
Governmental Units
The legislative history of the ECPA shows an overall intention
to include electronic communications within the scope of the
Act.30 8 In updating the federal wiretapping statute, Congress also
amended section 2520(a), adding the word "entity" to the civil lia-
bility provision.309 Although the legislative history of that section is
detailed, it makes no mention of the motivations for adding the
word "entity" to the statute.31 0
Under the ECPA generally, Congress also amended 18 U.S.C.
section 2707(a), the civil remedies provision for interception of
stored wire and electronic communications. 311 The amendment was
identical to section 2520(a), adding "or entity" after the word "per-
son". 312 In the Senate Committee Report, it is stated that the word
"entity" includes governmental entities.313 Some courts have uti-
lized the identical amendments to argue that the word "entity" in-
cludes a government entity under section 2520(a). 314 Other courts
maintain a plain meaning view of the amendments and hold that
legislature was clearly silent on the amendment, evidencing no in-
306 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)(Powell,
J., concurring); United States. v. McLemore, 28 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 1994); Mil-
waukee Gun Club v. Schulz, 979 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1992).
307 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 756; McLemore, 28 F.3d at 1162-63; Cont'l
Can Co., Inc. v. Mellon, 825 F.2d 308, 310 (11th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Metro. Atlanta
Rapid Transit Auth., 681 F.2d 1376, 1378-79 (11th Cir. 1982).
308 See Amati v. City of Woodstock, 829 F.Supp. 998, 1002 (N.D. I11. 1993).
309 ECPA § 103.
310 1986 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, at 3555-3606.
311 ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 103, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
312 Id.
313 S. REP. No. 99-541;%at 43 (1986).
314 See e.g., Conner v. Tate, 130 F.Supp.2d 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
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tent to add a governmental entity to the civil liability provision.
315
Courts have held that a government entity can be held civilly liable
under section 2720(a).
3 16
B. Sixth Circuit Holds that Entity Applies to Municipality
In Adams v. Battle Creek,317 the Sixth Circuit held that a city
could be civilly liable under the act and addressed the interpreta-
tion of the word "person" under the federal wiretapping statute.
318
In Adams, the City of Battle Creek Police Department tapped a
police officer's pager without a warrant or any notice to the of-
ficer.319 The police department used a "clone" pager 320 because
they thought the officer was assisting drug dealers.
321
In examining the liability of the municipality under the federal
wiretapping statute, 322 the Sixth Circuit held that the word "per-
son" encompassed the city of Battle Creek and therefore the city
was amenable to a civil suit under the act.323 The Court noted that
most courts that have addressed the issue have found civil liability
for government entities under the Act.3 24 The only circuit to disa-
gree with this view is the Seventh Circuit. 325 The Sixth Circuit spe-
cifically distinguished this interpretation as unavailing.
326
315 Amati v. City of Woodstock, 829 F.Supp. 998 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
316 In Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United States Dep't of Justice, the Second
Circuit held that government entities can be held civilly liable under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2707(a) which deals with civil liability for electronic communication service prov-
iders. 18 F.3d 91, cert. denied, 114 S Ct 2679 (2d Cir. 1994).
317 250 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2001).
318 Id. at 985.
319 Id. at 982.
320 When a page is sent to a pager which is cloned, both the original pager and
the clone receive the same message without the sender's or the receiver's knowl-
edge. Discussion of clone pager in dissent. Id. at 988.
321 Id. at 982.
322 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2002).
323 Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
324 Organizacion JD Ltda. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 18 F.3d 91, 94-95
(2d Cir. 1994); Conner v. Tate, 130 F.Supp.2d 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2001); Dorris v. Ab-
sher, 959 F.Supp. 813, 819-20 (M.D. Tenn. 1997); PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge
Police Dep't, 832 F.Supp. 808, 822-23 (D.N.J. 1993).
325 Amati v. Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir. 1999); Abbott v. Vill. of
Winthrop Harbor, 205 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 2000); (discussed infra Part III.C.).
326 Adams, 250 F.3d at 985. The Sixth Circuit pointed out that:
[The Seventh Circuit] based its cursory decision to exempt govern-
ment entities from liability under the Act solely on the plain lan-
guage of the definition of "person" in the statute, which does not
expressly include governmental entities; but it did not deal with the
2003] UNAUTHORIZED WIRETAPPING 685
The proper interpretation, according to Adams,327 is to ex-
amine the legislative history in order to interpret the word "en-
tity"328 which was added in 1986.329 The Court construed the 1986
amendment to specifically encompass government entities. 330 The
word "person" had already been interpreted to include business en-
tities based upon the language of the definition.331 To the Adams
court, if the term "entity" was not interpreted to include govern-
ment entities, the addition of the word "entity" was superfluous. 332
Further, the court drew support from judicial interpretations and
legislative history of the civil liability provision for interception of
stored wire and electronic communications,333 which specifically
held that the addition of "entity" was intended to include govern-
ment entities. 334
C. Seventh Circuit Holds that Plain Meaning of Statute Exempts
Governmental Entities
A plain meaning interpretation of the statute would seem to
exclude a government entity from liability as a "person". 335 The
federal wiretapping statute defines a person as "any employee, or
agent of the United States or any State or political subdivision
thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock
company, trust or corporation. '3 36 The legislative history further in-
dicates that "[t]he definition explicitly includes any officer or em-
ployee of the United States or any State or political subdivision of a
State .... Only the governmental units themselves are excluded. 337
In a pre-1986 case interpreting the OCSA, 3 3 8 the Southern District
of New York held that "person does not include the United
States. '339 This view was reaffirmed by the amendments of the
meaning of the word "entity." Finding no ambiguity, it refused to
look to the legislative history. Id.
327 Id.
328 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (2002).
329 ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 103, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
330 Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a).
334 Adams, 250 F.3d at 985.
335 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a).
336 Id. at § 2510(6).
337 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2179.
338 OCSA, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (1968).
339 Spock v. United States, 464 F.Supp. 510, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
USA PATRIOT Act,340 which explicitly excluded the United States
from the ambit of section 2520(a).341
In Amati v. Woodstock,342 the Seventh Circuit held that the
plain meaning of the statute did not allow for a lawsuit against a
local municipality. 343 The court refused to extend the meaning of
the word "person" to include a municipality.344 The suit was
brought under the federal wiretapping statute 345 against the former
police chief and members of the Woodstock, Illinois police depart-
ment for tapping one of the department's telephone lines. 346
The plaintiffs were sixty-three employees and former employ-
ees of the Woodstock police department. 347 It was common knowl-
edge within the police department that most of the phone lines
were recorded for policy reasons. 348 On these phone lines, an audi-
ble beep could be heard, which would alert the users that the com-
munication was being recorded.349 The employees, to make
personal phone calls under the belief they were not being recorded,
used one specific phone line.350 Although the phone line did not
emit the audible beep of the other recorded lines, it was in fact
being recorded without the knowledge of the police officers. 351
The district court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed
the suit against the municipality because the City of Woodstock was
not a proper defendant under the federal wiretapping statute.352
The court began by analyzing the language of the statute itself,
which the court argued must be regarded as conclusive. 353 Using
this analysis, the court concluded that a municipality was not con-
340 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
341 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (2002).
342 176 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 1999).
343 The Seventh Circuit merely affirmed the lower court's ruling, while focus-
ing on other issues unrelated to civil remedies. The court's only statement on the
civil remedy prevision was, "The plaintiffs also complain about the dismissal of the
City of Woodstock as a defendant, which was, however, proper, because Title III
does not allow for suits against municipalities." Id. at 956.
344 Id.
345 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.






352 Amati v. Woodstock, 829 F.Supp. 998 (N.D. I11. 1993).




templated within the scope of the federal wiretapping statute at is-
sue. 354 It then went on to discuss the exclusion of local government
entities from the federal wiretapping statute.
355
While it is true that the amended version of section
2520 now contains the language "person or entity"
when referring to parties against whom a civil action
may be brought, such language alone does not create
an ambiguity in the statute or constitute a clear expres-
sion of Congressional intent to include local govern-
ment entities as potential civil defendants under the
Crime Control Act. First, section 2511 was also
amended and now refers in one of its subsections to
"person or entity". There was no provision comparable
to section 2511(3)(a) in the original statute. No other
provision of section 2511 contains the "person or en-
tity" language. Nevertheless, to maintain consistency
with the alternative language contained in section
251'1(3)(a), it would have been necessary for Congress
to have placed similar language in the remedial provi-
sions of section 2520, which it did. Thus, there exists a
reasonable explanation for the addition of the word
"entity" in section 2520 which is short of a Congres-
sional intent to amend the statute to include local gov-
ernment entities as potential defendants. Furthermore,
in view of this likely explanation for the inclusion of
the term "entity", it cannot properly be considered
superfluous.
Second, the legislative history pertaining to the 1986
amendments to sections 2511 and 2520, while relatively
detailed, is silent as to the reason behind the use of the
term "entity". 356
The court held that there was not enough evidence of Congres-
sional intent to include a local municipality and therefore that the
municipality was not liable under section 2520(a). 357 In an opinion
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 Id. at 1002-1003.
357 Id. at 1003.
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by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the lower court dismissing the municipality. 358
In Adams,359 the Sixth Circuit criticized the interpretation uti-
lized by the Seventh Circuit as Against the legislative history and
reasonable interpretation of the statute.360 Seven years later, the
Seventh Circuit was once again confronted with the issue of munici-
pal liability under the federal wiretap statute in Abbott v. Village of
Winthrop Harbor.361 In 1991, Winthrop Harbor, Illinois decided to
overhaul the village's 911 emergency telephone system. 362 When
the new system was put into place, the lines running into the system
were hooked up to a recording device. 363 The only line not con-
nected to the device was a line used by employees for personal
calls.
36 4
In August 1992, the police chief had an independent contractor
hook the personal calls line up to the recording device, and in-
structed the contractor not to tell anyone about the connection.365
Recordings took place for three months before the connection to
the recording device was discovered. 366 Even after discovery, the
phone line was still tapped until May 1993, when the chief learned
of a lawsuit against the county regarding the tapping of a phone line
without notice. 367
The court began its inquiry by looking at the definition of "per-
son" 368 under the federal wiretapping statute.369 It reasoned that a
358 Amativ. Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir. 1999).
359 Adams v. Battle Creek, 250 F.3d. 980 (6th Cir. 2001).
360 See supra Part II.B.
361 205 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 2000).
362 Id. at 978.
363 Id.
364 Id. The police department received a memorandum that all phone calls
were being recorded, except on the line used by employees for personal calls. The
memo instructed all police officers to use a recorded line whenever engaging in
official police business. Id.
365 Id. at 979. On the other tapped lines, an audible beep was heard to let the
callers know that the conversation was being taped. No beep was placed on the
personal calls line so the users had no way of knowing their conversation was being
taped. The only people told of the connection were the telecommunications super-
visor and the deputy chief of the police department. Id.
366 Id.
367 Police chief Miller was convicted under the statute and did not appeal the
conviction. The only appeal present was the Village of Winthrop Harbor on the
issue of liability under the federal wiretapping act. Id. at 977-78.
368 18 U.S.C. 2510(6) (2002).
369 Abbott. 205 F.3d at 980.
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municipality does not fall under the definition, and "[a]bsent a
clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, the statutory lan-
guage must be regarded as conclusive. '370 The court noted that the
legislative history of section 2520 was silent in regards to the 1986
addition of the word "entity". 371 It pointed to the district court
opinion in Amati,372 which concluded
It is unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended
to subject an entire class of defendants to potential lia-
bility without any expression of that intent in the legis-
lative commentary. It becomes even more peculiar that
Congress would not utter any insight into its intent to
do so if in fact it effectuated such a substantial change
in the law by simply adding one word to the statute.
This is especially so when one considers that the ex-
press definition of "person" went untouched by the
1986 amendment.37
3
The court also rested its decision on the fact that Congress had not
amended section 2510(6) to include a municipality within the ambit
of the word "person". 374
We, too, are persuaded that municipalities are immune
from suit, not only because of the corroborating testi-
mony in the legislative history, but simply because
Congress has never amended the definition of "per-
son" in sec. 2510(6). That definition unequivocally ex-
cludes local governmental entities from its definition of
person and continues to apply to the entire chapter. 375
Therefore, the court concluded, a local municipality is not subject
to civil liability under this provision of the federal wiretapping
statute.376
370 Id. (citing Milwaukee Gun Club v. Schulz, 979 F.2d 1252, 1255 (7th Cir.
1992)).
371 Id.
372 Amati v. Woodstock, 829 F.Supp. 998 (N.D. I11. 1993).
373 Id. at 1003.
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IV. GOVERNMENT MUNICIPALITIES SHOULD BE HELD CIVILLY
LIABLE UNDER THE FEDERAL WIRETAPPING LAW
Utilizing the three statutory interpretation methodologies,
377 it
is clear that a local government entity is not given a special exemp-
tion from the statute for civil liability. Under a plain meaning analy-
sis of the statute, as used by the Seventh Circuit, a redundancy is
created in the phrase "person or entity" by replacing person with
"business entity" as interpreted by courts. Furthermore, while the
legislative history of 18 U.S.C. section 2520(a) is silent, looking at
the legislative history generally shows that governmental entities
are to be held civilly liable. Finally, the federal wiretap act's statu-
tory scheme evidences an intention to hold these entities civilly
liable.
A. Plain Meaning Interpretation Creates Redundancy
The first method of statutory interpretation is to look at the
face of the statute and analyze its plain meaning. On its face, 18
U.S.C. section 2520(a) does not give a definite answer as to applica-
tion to governmental entities. Applying a plain meaning approach
to the statute, the Seventh Circuit held that a government munici-
pality was not civilly liable. This approach, however, was specifi-
cally criticized by the Sixth Circuit, which analyzed the statute on its
face, through legislative history and by examining the statutory
scheme.
The analysis of the statute begins with the definition of the
word "person" contained in 18 U.S.C. section 2510(6). The defini-
tion of "person" in the wiretap statute is "any employee, or agent of
the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and
any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust
or corporation. '378 This definition has been held to include business
entities generally. 379 The legislative history of the 1968 passage of
377 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)(Powell,
J., concurring); United States. v. McLemore, 28 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 1994); Mil-
waukee Gun Club v. Schulz, 979 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1992); Cont'l Can Co., Inc. v.
Mellon, 825 F.2d 308, 310 (11th Cir. 1987); Jones v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit
Auth., 681 F.2d 1376, 1378-79 (11th Cir. 1982).
378 18 U.S.C. 2510(6) (2002).
379 Conner v. Tate, 130 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2001)(citing Bodunde
v. Parizek, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7365 (N.D. Il1. 1993); Smith v. Hartford, 2000
Conn. Super LEXIS 1847 (Conn. Super. 2000); Dorris v. Absher, 959 F.Supp. 813
(M.D. Tenn. 1997)).
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the federal wiretap act points out that: "The definition [of person]
explicitly includes any officer or employee of the United States or
any State or political subdivision of a State . . . Only the govern-
mental units themselves are excluded."
380
Utilizing the plain meaning approach of the Seventh Circuit
creates a redundancy in the statute.381 If "person" is interpreted
consistently with the Amati382 and Abbott383 decisions, it creates a
redundancy because the words "or entity other than the United
States"' 384 in the statute are then superfluous. 385 With the prior in-
terpretations, which include business entities under the definition of
"person," the statute would be read as "business entity or entity,
other than the United States." This interpretation is not consistent
with any explicit legislative history evidencing the need to repeat
the term "entity" within the same sentence clause. As the Bodunde
court stated, "If [entity] meant only to refer to business entities, it
would be redundant or superfluous. ' 386 That view was also reaf-
firmed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Adams.387
In an earlier decision, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois found that, "Section 2520(a) expressly
provides that municipal entities may be held liable for violations of
the Federal Wiretapping Act. '388
380 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968) (quoted in Dorris v. Absher,
959 F.Supp. 813, 819 (M.D. Tenn. 1997); PBA Local No. 308 v. Woodbridge Police
Dep't, 832 F.Supp. 808, 823 (D.N.J. 1993); Spock v. United States, 464 F.Supp. 510,
514 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
381 Bodunde, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *3.
382 See supra Part III.C.; Amati v. Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir.
1999).
383 See supra Part III.C.; Abbott v. Village of Winthrop Harbor, 205 F.3d 976
(7th Cir. 2000).
384 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (2002).
385 "It is a basic rule of statutory construction that, if possible, effect is to be
given to each and every word, clause and sentence in a statute, and a construction
that results in any portion of a statute being superfluous should be avoided."
Bodunde, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *11.
386 Id. at *3 (quoted in Dorris v. Absher, 959 F.Supp. 813, 820 (M.D. Tenn.
1997)).
387 "In order for the term not to be superfluous, the term 'entity' necessarily
means governmental entities." Adams v. Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir.
2001).
388 Bodunde, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *12.
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B. The Legislative History of the Federal Wiretap Act and its
Amendments Support Civil Liability for Local
Governmental Entities
The second method for interpreting a statute is to look at the
legislative history in order to glean Congressional intent. Most
courts analyzing the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. section 2520(a)
note the lack of mention of applicability to governmental entities.
In order to remedy this, courts then look to the similar amendments
to 18 U.S.C. section 2707(a) and its legislative history ,which posi-
tively indicates an application to governmental entities.
Courts analyzing the legislative history to the ECPA amend-
ments have held local governmental entities civilly liable. The ex-
ception are the Seventh Circuit courts,38 9 which found that the
addition of "or entity" was not evidence of a clear Congressional
intent to include local governmental entities under the civil remedy
provision.390 The court specifically pointed to the absence of an in-
tention in the legislative history to 18 U.S.C. sections 2511 and 2520
to include the governmental entities under the civil remedy
provision.391
A typical approach to this situation was used by the court in
PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Department. In PBA Local
No. 38, the court began by analyzing the definition of "person" in
section 2510(6).392 To the court, the legislative history clearly indi-
cated that an entity is not encompassed by that definition.393 Next,
the court looked at the legislative history of section 2707(a), 394
which applied the civil remedies provision to governmental enti-
389 Abbott v. Vill. Of Winthrop Harbor, 205 F.3d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2000);
Amati v. Woodstock, 829 F.Supp. 998, 1002-03 (N.D.Ill 19993).
390 Abbott, 205 F.3d. at 980; Amati, 829 F.Supp. at 1002-03.
391 Amati, 829 F. Supp. at 1003. The court pointed out the lack of a statement
in the legislative history.
It is unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended to subject an
entire class of defendants to potential liability without any expres-
sion of that intent in the legislative commentary. It becomes even
more peculiar that Congress would not utter any insight into its
intent to do so if in fact it effectuated such a substantial change in
the law by simply adding one word to the statute.
392 PBA Local No. 38 v. Woodbridge Police Dep't, 832 F.Supp. 808, 823
(D.N.J. 1993).
393 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968) and Spock v. United States, 464
F.Supp. 510, 514 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
394 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 43 (1986); H. REP No. 99-647, at 74 (1986).
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ties.395 The interpretation of section 2707(a), based upon its legisla-
tive history has held governmental entities civilly liable.396 The
courts that have interpreted this provision have noted that sections
2520(a) and 2707(a) were amended at the same time, adding the
same language.397 Using this comparison, the court found the legis-
lative history showed that a local governmental entity could be
civilly liable under section 2520(a). 398 In fact, the court pointed out
that prior to the 1986 amendments adding "entity," governmental
entities could not be held liable for violations of the federal wiretap
act.
399
C. The Statutory Scheme of the Federal Wiretap Act and its
Amendments Supports Civil Liability for Local
Governmental Entities
The third method to analyze the federal wiretapping statute is
to look at the statutory scheme of the statute. Various courts have
utilized this approach when analyzing civil liability for governmen-
tal entities under the federal wiretapping act. Whereas a plain
meaning methodology focuses solely on the face of the statute at
issue, the statutory scheme allows a court to look at other similar
provisions.
In the 1986 ECPA amendments to the federal wiretapping act,
both civil remedy provisions of the OCSA were amended with iden-
tical amendments. 400 Prior to the ECPA amendments, governmen-
tal entities were generally excluded from civil liability under the
federal wiretap act.401 Through analysis of the entire act, it appears
that a motivation of the drafters was to bring government entities
under the ambit of the statute as enunciated in the legislative his-
tory to section 2707(a). The court, in PBA Local No. 38, found that
395 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 43 (1986); H. REP No. 99-647, at 74 (1986).
396 Organizacion JD Ltda v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 18 F.3d 91, 94-95 (citing PBA
Local No. 38, 832 F.Supp. at 823; Bodunde v. Parizek, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7365
(N.D. 111. 1993).
397 Adams v. Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2001).
398 The court found, "This reasoning is persuasive. Principles of statutory con-
struction and the legislative history of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 indicate that governmental entities such as the Woodbridge [Police Depart-
ment] defendants can be subject to liability under § 2520(a)." PBA Local No. 38,
832 F.Supp. at 823.
399 Id. at 824.
400 See ECPA, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 103, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
401 PBA Local No. 38, 832 F.Supp. at 824.
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the ECPA amendments generally were intended to bring govern-
mental entities under the ambit of the act.
40 2
The 2001 amendments to the federal wiretapping act also show
a distinct statutory scheme. The addition of the words "other than
the United States" provides an exemption for liability in the federal
government. Through this amendment, however, it appears that a
special niche has been created for local governmental entities that
are not extensions of the federal government. Using a plain mean-
ing approach to the statute would clearly create this niche. How-
ever, examining the legislative history and the statutory scheme,
there is no evidence of an intention to create such an exemption. In
fact, it appears that Congress already believed local governmental
entities were included in civil liability. Therefore, there was no need
to create an explicit reference in the federal wiretapping statute to
create civil liability for a group that is already covered.
V. CONCLUSION
Civil liability for local municipalities is not explicitly defined in
the federal wiretapping statute. Some believe that local municipali-
ties occupy a niche where civil liability cannot attach for violations
of the statute. It is unreasonable to believe that Congress would
implicitly create such an exception in favor of government entities
other than the United States. The ECPA amendments of 1986 ad-
ded the word "entity" to both sections 2520(a) and 2707(a). While
the legislative history to section 2520(a) is silent as to the specific
motivations behind the addition of "entity," the history of section
2707(a) clearly indicates that the amendment brought government
entities under the scope of the statute. Therefore, looking at the
ECPA amendments generally, the intent to bring governmental en-
tities under the statute's scope can be transferred to section
2520(a).
The United States has a long history of intercepting communi-
cations made by wires.403 From the battlefields of the Civil War to
the battlefields of World War II, wiretapping has been an important
strategic weapon.404 During the 1800's it was used as a tool of com-
petition between newspapers in San Francisco, and during the early
1980's it was interception of electronic transmissions that was
402 Id.
403 See supra Part II.
404 See DASH, supra note 65, at 30; see supra Part II.A.3.
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termed "electronic espionage" between the world's largest compa-
nies. 40 5 In the early 1900's, the battle was moved to the courtroom
as the challenge became balancing an individual's right to privacy
against the interests of the public good.
40 6
Finally, Congress entered the fray in 1968 and passed the first
comprehensive federal wiretapping statute. After the passage of the
Omnibus Act of 1968, it was said
Whatever one may say about the provisions passed, the
statute is based on an honest recognition of the fact
that society will not tolerate or support total bars on
official surveillance by devices in cases of certain seri-
ous crimes or threats to national security. Limited and
supervised surveillance by a core group of law enforce-
ment, not secret, agencies is the best way to achieve
working sanctions against wholesale use of surveillance
devices. 407
Wiretapping came to historical prevalence in the 1970's Watergate
and impeachment of President Richard Nixon.408 After the elec-
tronic espionage of the 1980's, Congress revisited the statute with
the ECPA and updated our laws to include electronic
communications.
40 9
As the United States faces a new world of challenges following
September 11, 2001, the use of wiretapping figures to play a larger
role in our future. While our national security is a paramount goal
in our policies, the rights of individuals hold equal sway within our
405 See supra Part II.A.
406 See supra Part II.A.1.
407 CEDERBAUMS, supra note 257, at 25-26.
408 In response to the unauthorized wiretapping by the Nixon administration,
at least two lawsuits were filed. In Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1979), a
newspaper reporter brought a cause of action against the administration for unau-
thorized wiretapping under the federal wiretapping act. In Halperin v. Kissinger,
606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), a former member of the National Security Council
brought suit under the federal wiretapping act for unauthorized wiretapping of his
home telephone.
409 See infra Part II.C.
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Constitutional system. As Justice Holmes pointed out, we are
forced.to choose between the lesser of two evils. 410
Andrew Ayers
410 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475-6 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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